Mortgage prepayments play a crucial role in the pricing and hedging of mortgage backed securities. An important feature of mortgage prepayment modeling is burnout; as time goes on those borrowers who have the greatest tendency to refinance are removed from the pool leaving only those that are less likely to refinance. In this paper we examine the implications of burnout on the late time prepayment rate using rather general assumptions. Analytic formulas are derived for the average prepayment rate in the N 'th month, P SM M N , and the fraction of borrowers remaining in the pool in the N 'th month, y N . In the case where the incentive to refinance, and other relevant economic factors, are constant these results are particularly simple. For example,
The pricing and price volatility of mortgage backed securities depend critically on the mortgage prepayment rate (Fabozzi [1992] ). Prepayment models have several components, of which the two most important are refinancing and turnover. The refinancing component of a prepayment model captures prepayments due to the incentive provided by lower mortgage rates in the market than the mortgage holder's own mortgage. The turnover component captures prepayments due to mortgagor mobility, home sales etc. An important aspect of the refinancing component is that mortgage holders in the pool have different propensity to refinance. As time goes on those with the greatest tendency to refinance are removed from the pool leaving only those less likely to refinance. This phenomena is usually called burnout (Hayre [1994] ). In this paper we examine the implications of burnout for the prepayment rate at late times. Assuming that the refinancing probability and the initial distribution of borrowers are smooth functions of the borrowers propensity to refinance, we derive formulas for the average single monthly mortality in the N'th month, P
SM M N
, and the fraction of borrowers left in the pool after the N'th month, y N (i.e. the survival factor). In the case that the incentive to prepay, and other relevant economic factors, are constant with time these results are very simple;
, where p (0) is a constant. (Here N, N 0 and N − N 0 are assumed large and terms less important for large values of these quantities are neglected.) The term of order 1/N in P SM M N reflects the fact that burnout causes the prepayment rate to decrease with N and it gives rise to the factor of N 0 /N in the expression for y N . We compare our prediction for P
with the results of simulations based on the PIMCO prepayment model and find good agreement when N is large.
Suppose the pool of mortgage holders is distributed in a parameter θ that characterizes their propensity to refinance. The (normalized) distribution of mortgage holders in the pool at the end of month n is denoted by f n (θ), and the initial distribution of mortgage holders in the pool is denoted by f 0 (θ). The integral of f n (θ) over allowed values of θ is unity. Let p r (n; θ) be the probability of refinancing, at a given θ, in month n. It depends on various factors of which the most important is the incentive to refinance. The incentive to refinance is variously modeled by different groups to be a function of the difference, or the ratio of the mortgage coupon and the current mortgage rate. The probability of prepaying in month n due to other effects like turnover and defaults is denoted by p o (n). At a given value of θ, the total probability of prepaying in the n'th month is p(n; θ) = p r (n; θ) + p o (n).
Without loss of generality we assume that f 0 (θ) = 1 with 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. If this isn't true just choose a new parameter θ ′ to label the propensity to refinance such that dθ ′ = f (θ)dθ. In terms of this variable the probability of prepaying in month n is p(n; θ ′ ) = p(n; θ(θ ′ )). The choice f 0 (θ) = 1 has the disadvantage that it makes the probability to prepay dependent on the initial distribution of borrowers in propensity to refinance, but it is convenient for our purposes. Then the distribution of borrowers after month n is (Hayre, Chaudhary and Young [2000] ),
where the normalization constant A n is determined from the condition that the integral of f n (θ) over θ is unity. By assuming that f n satisfies eq. (1) we have put the media effect into the value of p(n; θ) (rather than in the evolution of f n (θ)) and neglected changes in f n (θ) arising from the evolution of borrower credit and financial circumstances.
Suppose larger values of θ correspond to a greater propensity to refinance. Then if the incentive to refinance is significant p(n; θ) is an increasing function of θ and eq. (1) implies that the distribution of borrowers becomes peaked near θ = 0 for late times. Since at late times it is the small θ region that is relevant we expand the probability of prepaying in a power series about θ = 0,
where the ellipses denote terms with higher powers of θ. Clearly eq. (2) relies on the assumption that the probability p(n; θ) is smooth in θ so that it can be expanded in a power series. The first term in eq. (2) is the prepayment probability at θ = 0,
, and the coefficient of θ in the second term is the first derivative of the refinancing probability with respect to θ evaluated at θ = 0, p
(1) (n) = dp r (n; 0)/dθ. Combining eq. (1) and the terms explictly shown in eq. (2) and using
gives that, for large N, the distribution of borrowers after month N is,
where
Here we have assumed that p (1) (n) = 0. If p (1) (n) is zero or anomalously small then terms we have considered as subdominant for large N are actually important. Since δ N is the average of N terms it is reasonable to assume (provided the refinancing incentive remains significant for most of the time) that δ N is order unity ( i .e. is not small for large N). Then eq. (4) indicates that as time evolves from the origination of the mortgage to month N the distribution of mortgage holders, in propensity to refinance, goes from flat (by convention) to strongly exponentially peaked near θ = 0. Note that eq. (4) is valid only for large N and terms suppressed by powers of 1/N or exp[−N] have been neglected. It is not likely that for early months the first two terms in the power series expansion of the prepayment rate about θ = 0 are the dominant ones. However, for large N, these are a negligible part of the sum in eq. (5).
The average prepayment rate in the n'th month is (Hayre, Chaudhary and Young [2000] )
Using the expression for f N in eq. (4), and eq. (2), the average single month mortality at late times is given by,
where the ellipses represent terms suppressed by more powers of 1/N or exponentially suppressed. Thus burnout causes the prepayment rate to evolve towards p (0) (N), differing from it, by the term of order 1/N shown in eq. (7). In the case where
are constants independent of time the average prepayment rate in the N'th month becomes,
All dependence on the first derivative of the prepayment probability with respect to θ, p (1) , has disappeared. The prepayment rate P SM M N approaches p (0) in a universal fashion independent of the details of the initial distribution of borrowers and the θ dependence of the probability to prepay.
Prepayment rates are of often quoted on a yearly basis. Using the relation 1 − P
12 , between the constant prepayment rate P
CP R N
and the single monthly mortality, eq. (8) implies that
Eqs. (8) and (9) are the main results of this paper. It is interesting to compare eq. (8) with what would be obtained using the continuous time approximation. Then eq. (1) becomes,
This gives a coefficient of the order 1/N term in eq. (8) of 1 instead of 1 − p (0) . The p (0) in the order 1/N term is arises from the fact that the payments are made discretely and not continuously.
The validity of eq. (8) or eq. (9) does not require the prepayment probability to be independent of time for all time. Only the late time behavior is important in the derivation of these results. These simple formulas may provide a useful"rule of thumb" for estimating the importance of burnout on the late time prepayment rate. The value of N at which eq. (9) becomes an accurate approximation can be ascertained by comparing this equation with the results of a realistic prepayment model. In Figure 1 we compare this equation with the results of a simulation based on the PIMCO prepayment model for generic Fannie Mae 30-year mortgages with low seasoning. The effects of turnover were shut off and the incentive to refinance was a constant 200 bp, to emphasize long time burnout behavior. The darker line is eq. (9) with the value p (0) = 0.00958 fitted to the large N part of the simulation. We see that eq. (9) fits very well after N = 100. Fits of similar quality hold for other values of the incentive to refinance and if turnover is included.
Our results depend crucially on the assumption that the mortgage holders are smoothly distributed in the continuous variable θ. Suppose that θ could only take on a few discrete values, θ k , k = 1, 2, . . . , k max , and the propensity to refinance increases with k. Let the initial fraction of borrowers corresponding to θ k be f k and let p(θ k ) denote their prepayment probability. In this case the analog of eq. (8) for the late time behavior of the prepayment rate is (Hayre [1994] )
Now burnout causes the prepayment rate to approach p(θ 1 ) exponentially fast. Furthermore, the approach is not universal depending on f 2 /f 1 and p(θ 2 ) − p(θ 1 ).
With a large pool of mortgage holders it is likely that treating θ as a continuous variable is appropriate. Even with θ continuous it is possible that the refinance probability is not analytic in θ. This would occur, for example, if a finite fraction of the pool had zero probability to prepay even if the incentive to prepay was significant. Empirically, mortgage holders that never prepay are rare and it seems reasonable that in a statistical sense they can be treated as a set of measure zero.
The fraction of mortgage holders remaining in the pool after the n'th month is
Using eq. (8) for the single month mortality eq. (12) gives,
where it is assumed that, N, N 0 and N − N 0 are all large. The factor of N 0 /N is a consequence of burnout. Since the single month mortality and the fraction of borrowers left in the pool both depend on the month N, we can eliminate N and express the single month mortality as a function of the fraction remaining in the pool, P SM M (y). For small y eq. (8) and eq. (13) imply that,
where the ellipses denote terms less important as y goes to zero. Even though the refinancing probability was assumed to be an analytic function of the propensity to refinance the average prepayment rate is not analytic as a function of y. It's derivatives are singular at y = 0. We do not expect the term explicitly displayed in eq. (14) to be an accurate approximation unless y is very small, since neglecting the ellipses treats − ln y as much larger than ln(− ln y). Also, keeping only the term explicitly displayed in eq. (14) is clearly not valid in the case p (0) = 0. In that case, P SM M (y) = ξy, where ξ = 1/N 0 y 0 is a constant. In this paper we examined the implications of burnout for the late time behavior of the single monthly mortality P SM M N and the survival factor y N (in the N'th month). Our main assumption was that the probability to refinance and the initial distribution of borrowers are smoothly distributed in a variable, θ, that labels borrowers propensity to refinance. In the case that the incentive to prepay, and other relevant economic factors, are constant with time these results are very simple; reflects the fact that burnout causes the prepayment rate to decrease with N and it gives rise to the factor of N 0 /N in the expression for y N . The approach of the single monthly mortality to its limiting value, p (0) , is independent of the details of the initial distribution of borrowers and the θ dependence of the probability of refinancing. We compared our prediction for P 
